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Abstract		This	 paper	 explores	 the	 production	 and	 supply	 of	 safety	 information	 under	 a	 neoliberal	 regime,	where	economic	incentives	and	competition	rather	than	regulations,	supervision	and	enforcement,	comprise	the	common	sense	to	guarantee	a	safe	workplace.	Following	a	political	economy	of	com-munication	 framework	 on	 the	 Chilean	 sector,	 this	 assessment	 unpacks	 the	 relationship	 between	Workers’	Compensation	Boards’	(WCBs)	informational	resources	and	their	economic	process	of	ex-change	within	a	neoliberal	context.	The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	provide	a	well-grounded	theoret-ical	outline	to	analyse	safety	information,	and	to	offer	a	glimpse	of	the	particular	kind	of	informational	resources	and	goods	produced	by	neoliberal	WCBs.	The	following	analysis	discloses	that	WCBs	are	compelled	to	cede	control	over	their	symbolic	content	to	the	dynamics	of	the	market	place	and	the	logic	of	profit	maximization.	Economic	and	competition	imperatives	trigger	the	production,	on	the	one	hand,	of	informational	resources	as	distorted	rates,	and	on	the	other,	of	informational	goods	as	pro-corporate	safety	knowledge.	Workers	are	cognitively	misled	and	left	physically	and	mentally	un-protected	at	the	worksite.	This	paper	claims	that	due	to	a	free	market	model,	Chilean	WCBs	fail	to	protect	workers’	health	and	safety	by	producing	and	supplying	distorted	rates	and	corporate	friendly	knowledge.		
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1.	Introduction	
	In	2010	the	international	media	coverage	of	the	33	Chilean	miners	trapped	700	meters	underground	failed	to	make	sense	of	the	context	and	causes	of	the	accident.	In	line	with	their	business	of	capturing	and	selling	audience	to	advertisers,	the	mainstream	media	framed	this	tragic	event	as	an	epic	saga	of	government	leadership,	human	survival	and	the	triumph	of	the	will	to	live.	They	fell	short	to	report	and	explain	why	critical	information	about	the	dangers	and	threatening	working	conditions	of	the	mine	that	would	have	prevented	the	accident	in	the	first	place	was	not	released	in	advance.	The	Gov-ernment	Commission	Report	 timidly	and	vaguely	recognized	that	Workers’	Compensation	Boards	(WCBs)	lack	of	the	independence	to	communicate	and	inform	of	strict	and	detailed	safety	measures	
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since	in	case	of	an	unfavourable	report	they	could	lose	the	company	as	a	client	(Comisión	Asesora	Presidencial	para	la	Seguridad	en	el	Trabajo,	2010).	This	recognition	suggests	that	private	WCBs	are	reluctant	to	circulate	information	that	would	risk	the	economic	relationship	held	up	with	their	client	companies.	It	hints	that	the	distribution	of	symbolic	resources	to	address	working	conditions,	ade-quate	equipment,	machinery	maintenance,	safety	regulations	and	risk	prevention	measures,	may	be	influenced	by	the	forces	of	the	market	place.	This	paper	aims	to	shed	light	on	this	communication	breach	by	examining	how	WCBs	produce	and	supply	informational	resources	and	goods	to	their	client	companies	to	prevent	work-related	in-juries,	diseases	and	 fatalities.	 Following	a	political	 economy	of	 communication	 framework	on	 the	Chilean	WCBs	sector,	 I	explore	the	relationship	between	WCBs’	 informational	resources	and	their	economic	process	of	exchange	within	a	neoliberal	context.	Free	of	governmental	‘impurities’	—e.g.,	regulations,	 supervision	 and	 enforcement—the	Chilean	 case	provides	 a	unique	 setting	 to	 explore	how	safety	information	is	shaped	by	economic	imperatives.	It	 is	particularly	instructive	insofar	as	being	able	to	reveal	how	the	power	of	the	free	market	influences	the	production	of	safety	informa-tional	goods	and	resources.	This	paper	aims	to	(a)	provide	a	well-grounded	theoretical	outline	 to	analyse	safety	information,	and	to	(b)	offer	a	glimpse	of	the	particular	kind	of	safety	informational	resources	and	goods	produced	under	neoliberalism.		
2.	WCBs	in	Chile	
	WCBs	are	agencies	that	manage	health	and	safety	at	the	workplace.	These	institutions	aim	to	com-pensate	and	prevent	work	related	 injuries,	diseases	and	fatalities.	As	a	result	of	 the	high	accident	rates	 due	 to	 the	 industrial	 revolution,	WCBs	were	 first	 introduced	 in	Germany	 in	 1884	 and	 then	spread	to	the	rest	of	Europe	and	North	America	in	the	early	1900’s	(Guinnane	&	Streb,	2015).	These	agencies	operate	on	the	basis	of	a	compulsory	insurance	mechanism	in	order	to	fairly	allocate	the	costs	across	member	corporations.	However,	rather	than	limiting	the	growth	of	accidents,	this	insur-ance	system	proved	to	be	very	effective	in	delivering	financial	compensation	to	injured	workers	in	a	formalized	way	(Guinnane	&	Streb,	2015).	In	Chile,	these	agencies	appear	in	1958.	Due	to	a	weak	state	apparatus,	private	WCBs	emerge	ahead	of	government	policies	and	later	on	were	granted	permission	to	operate	along	with	the	state	sponsored	WCB	(Dümmer,	1997).	Being	mandatory	to	join	a	WCB,	corporations	are	free	to	choose	among	four	nationwide	participants:	the	public	Instituto	de	Seguridad	Laboral,	and	the	private	Insti-tuto	de	Seguridad	del	Trabajo,	Mutual	de	Seguridad	and	Asociación	Chilena	de	Seguridad.	These	in-surance	agencies	compete	in	the	market	place	for	clients.	Their	offer	consists	mainly	of	(a)	full	med-ical	treatment,	physical	and	occupational	therapy	for	a	successful	return	to	work,	(b)	sick	pay,	finan-cial	compensation	and	pensions,	and	(c)	prevention	of	labor	accidents	and	professional	diseases.	By	improving	their	safety	indicators	through	better	medical	and	prevention	aid,	WCBs	compete	to	at-tract	new	customers	and	enlarge	their	market	share.			
3.	Neoliberal	Safety:	Economic	Incentives	and	Competition	for	a	Safer	Workplace	
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Chile	bears	a	neoliberal	political	economic	order	since	the	70’s.	This	neoliberal	regime	was	imposed	via	Pinochet’s	violent	coup	d’état	backed	by	the	United	States	(Harvey,	2005).	By	exploiting	the	Chil-ean	population’s	state	of	shock,	Milton	Friedman	advised	Pinochet	to	impose	a	rapid	transformation	of	the	Chilean	economy,	what	Klein	(2007)	dubbed	a	‘shock	therapy’.	Freed	from	the	state,	this	eco-nomic	project	is	characterized	by	(a)	privatizations,	(b)	deregulations,	(c)	cuts	in	social	spending,	(d)	free	trade,	and	(d)	corporate	tax	cuts	(Klein,	2007).	Under	a	neoliberal	order,	the	state	resigns	of	its	productive,	distributive	and	regulatory	functions,	while	the	economic	logic	of	the	free	market	is	given	full	authority	to	organize	every	aspect	of	social	life.			Although	WCBs	in	Chile	were	implemented	before	Pinochet’s	neoliberal	state,	their	private	and	deregulated	traits	have	galvanized	since	then.	The	 ‘neoliberal	experiment’	that	took	place	in	Chile	(Klein,	2007)	had	the	power	to	severely	weaken	public	institutions	and	at	the	same	time	reinforce	those	agencies	like	WCBs	who	adhered	to	free	market	principles.	Thus,	the	neoliberal	state	was	not	a	setback	for	the	WCBs	sector	which	relied	mainly	on	private	participants	but	on	the	contrary	a	great	impulse.	In	this	regard,	the	public	WCB	was	not	set	aside.	It	was	allowed	to	continue	its	operations	in	order	to	receive	those	uneconomical	workers	that	private	WCBs	denied	to	provide	service	like	house	maids.		Chilean	WCBs	operate	fluently	and	comfortable	within	a	neoliberal	state.	These	institutions	em-brace	one	of	the	main	neoliberal	mottos,	the	power	of	the	free	market	to	regulate	the	economic	and	social	life.	Under	the	assumption	of	the	ability	of	the	market	to	self-regulate,	the	WCBs’	sector	relies	almost	entirely	on	economic	incentives	to	manage	health	and	safety	at	the	worksite.	With	almost	no	safety	regulations,	standards,	guidelines,	supervision	and	enforcement,	companies	are	left	to	regulate	themselves	on	the	basis	of	economic	stimuli.	There	are	no	more	than	32	general	labour	safety	and	health	 norms	 and	 331	 inspectors	 nationwide	 to	 supervise	 more	 than	 433.000	 corporations	(Comisión	Asesora	Presidencial	para	la	Seguridad	en	el	Trabajo,	2010).	On	the	basis	of	an	incremental	premium	in	case	of	fatalities,	injuries	and	diseases,	companies	are	encouraged	to	engage	in	the	im-provement	of	working	conditions,	maintenance	of	machinery,	provision	of	safety	training	and	deliv-ering	of	safety	personnel	equipment.	Following	a	neoliberal	reasoning,	companies	should	effectively	manage	workers’	health	and	safety	in	order	to	stall	or	diminish	their	financial	contribution.	In	addi-tion,	another	 free	market	assumption	 is	 that	 injuries,	diseases	and	 fatalities	would	decline	due	 to	WCBs’	competition	for	new	clients.	In	this	regard,	competition	would	push	WCBs	to	improve	their	research	and	technical	operations	in	order	to	lower	injury	rates	and	thus	increase	their	market	share	by	offering	cheaper	premiums.	To	sum	up,	free	market	safety	relies	on	the	premise	that	the	pursuit	of	economic	gain	naturally	encourages	companies	to	provide	a	safe	worksite	and	WCBs	to	improve	their	services.		
	
4.	WCBs’	as	an	Information-Intensive	Sector:	Information	for	Economic	Exchange		A	feature	that	few	scholars	are	aware	of	is	that	WCBs	comprise	an	information-intensive	sector.	This	trait	has	been	largely	overlooked.	Regarded	as	scientific	and	technical	entities,	these	agencies	con-centrate	the	production	and	circulation	of	huge	symbolic	resources	to	protect	workers	against	work-related	 fatalities,	 injuries	 and	diseases.	WCBs	play	 an	 essential	 role	 in	 organizing	 and	 circulating	numbers,	data,	concepts	and	texts	through	which	workers	can	interpret	and	respond	to	labor	risks.	
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Workers’	health	and	safety	at	the	worksite	is	thus	highly	dependent	on	the	production	and	distribu-tion	of	WCBs’	symbolic	resources	such	as	risk	data,	accurate	indicators,	and	above	all,	high-quality	safety	knowledge.	Although	this	 is	not	something	hidden,	the	power	of	WCBs	in	shaping	workers’	consciousness	by	producing	and	circulating	information	is	only	known	to	insiders	of	this	sector.	In	this	regard,	I	claim	that	WCBs	constitute	a	cognitive	monopoly	on	health	and	safety.		In	addition,	WCBs	process	of	economic	exchange	is	an	informational	one.	This	constitutes	one	of	the	main	if	not	the	main	blind	spot	of	WCBs.	Contrary	to	common	sense,	WCBs	are	not	agencies	that	trade	medical	and	preventive	services	but	 insurance	companies	whose	main	product	are	 rates	 to	measure	 labor	health	 events	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	monthly	premium.	WCBs’	 central	 operation	 is	 the	transformation	of	work-related	fatalities,	injuries	and	diseases	into	informational	resources	—	e.g.,	injury	rate,	fatality	rate,	working	days	lost,	incapacity	rate	—	for	the	purpose	of	economic	exchange	(Finkelstein,	2015).	In	this	regard,	I	claim	that	rather	than	be	seen	as	providers	of	medical	and	pre-ventive	aid	WCBs	must	be	considered	in	terms	of	their	economic	process	of	exchange,	that	is,	insti-tutions	that	exchange	information	in	a	business	relationship.	Therefore,	WCBs’	symbolic	realm	must	be	addressed	within	the	logic	of	institutions	whose	economic	process	is	driven	by	the	dynamics	be-tween	client	companies	and	the	collection,	organization,	production	and	exchange	of	informational	resources.	In	addition,	WCBs’	symbolic	sphere	must	also	be	analyzed	in	their	complementary	process	of	assisting	client	companies	in	the	administration	of	rates	through	informational	goods.	WCBs	pro-duce	and	distribute	safety	knowledge	in	the	form	of	informational	goods	—	e.g.,	posters,	fliers,	bro-chures,	handbooks,	communication	campaigns	—	to	support	their	client	companies	in	exerting	con-trol	over	rates	and	premiums.	In	consequence,	the	examination	of	WCBs’	symbolic	production	has	to	be	done	by	framing	WCBs	as	an	information-intensive	sector	whose	main	economic	process	of	ex-change	includes	the	production	of	rates	to	swap	them	against	a	premium	as	well	as	informational	goods	to	manage	the	aforementioned	rates	and	thus	exert	control	over	the	cost	of	the	premium.		
	
5.	How	to	Theoretically	Approach	WCBs’	Information	
	Being	WCBs	intensive-information	companies	whose	main	product	are	rates	to	be	exchanged	for	a	premium,	I	suggest	that	WCBs’	informational	resources	and	goods	should	be	addressed	in	relation	to	what	Garnham	(1990)	calls	the	second	phase	of	cultural	production.	Under	a	second	phase,	culture	and	information	as	a	superstructural	phenomenon	comes	to	an	end	and	becomes	to	be	part	of	mate-rial	production	(Garnham,	1990).	Subordinated	to	the	free	movement	of	capital,	information	produc-tion	and	exchange	begins	to	be	defined	by	the	logic	of	the	market	place	—	i.e.,	offer/	demand.	This	means	that	when	looking	at	WCBs	informational	resources	and	goods	we	should	not	be	looking	at	issues	of	 ideological	control.	There	is	no	need	to	deal	with	the	content	itself	since	under	a	second	phase	 there	 is	no	necessary	coincidence	between	 the	 content	of	 information	and	 the	 ideas	of	 the	dominant	class	(Garnham,	1990).	This	approach	is	critical	to	avoid	inaccurate	results	by	addressing	WCBs’	symbolic	content	in	ideological	terms	—i.e.,	owners’	and	managers’	dominant	ideas.	To	un-derstand	the	main	drivers	of	safety	information	it	is	necessary	to	put	aside	concepts	of	ownership	and	ideological	domination	as	Garnham	(2014)	correctly	suggests	when	analysing	information	busi-nesses.	As	we	shall	see,	the	relationship	between	the	economic	and	symbolic	dimensions	of	WCBs	is	a	complex	one,	not	explicable	in	terms	of	conscious	intent	or	conspiracy.	
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Furthermore,	 information	 should	be	 conceptualized	not	as	a	product	but	as	a	 commodity,	 as	Schiller	(2007)	correctly	points	out	when	dealing	with	information-intensive	businesses.	Borrowing	from	Marx’s	(1990)	commodity	definition,	information	as	a	commodity	fulfills	the	purpose	of	being	exchanged	in	the	market	place	rather	than	serving	as	something	useful	per	se.	Its	utility	comes	from	what	it	can	bring	in	exchange.	It	is	a	vehicle	that	serves	exchange	value	within	a	business	relationship.	In	this	regard,	one	of	the	main	problems	when	analyzing	this	sector	 is	taking	for	granted	that	the	production	of	informational	resources	—	e.g.,	injury	rate,	fatality	rate,	working	days	lost	—	is	led	by	use	value	rather	than	exchange	value.	Informational	resources	are	mistakenly	taken	as	a	measure	of	labor	risks	—	i.e.,	as	use	value	—	rather	than	an	informational	commodity	manufactured	through	a	complex	process	of	production	to	swap	labor	risks	against	a	premium	—	i.e.,	as	an	exchange	value	(Finkelstein,	2015).	This	 is	highly	problematic,	because	 it	obscures	 the	 fact	 that	 informational	re-sources	as	commodities	are	removed	from	their	capacity	to	work	as	an	indicator	and	accurately	re-flect	labor	hazards	at	the	worksite.	Thus,	it	is	vital	to	approach	WCBs’	informational	resources	as	the	result	of	commodification	practices	through	which	they	are	brought	to	life.	
	
6.	Safety	Information	under	Neoliberal	WCBs	
	Now	that	the	economic,	political	and	theoretical	dimensions	have	been	well	established,	it	is	possi-ble	to	delve	into	the	symbolic	realm.	In	the	lines	that	follow	an	overview	of	the	particular	kind	of	informational	resources	and	goods	produced	by	neoliberal	WCBs	is	presented,	analysed	and	dis-cussed.	Following	a	political	economic	framework,	safety	information	is	not	presented	as	an	auton-omous	phenomenon	but	in	relation	to	the	economic,	political	and	social	spheres.	In	addition,	rather	than	something	neutral	and	innocuous,	safety	information	is	displayed	in	the	light	of	conflicting	in-terests,	power	relationships	and	ethical	concerns.				
	
6.1.	Safety	Informational	Resources	as	Distorted	Rates	
	WCBs’	main	activity	consists	of	the	production	of	informational	commodities	for	the	purpose	of	eco-nomic	exchange	under	free	market	conditions.	These	institutions	transform	tragic	labor	events	into	an	 informational	 commodity	—	rates	—	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	monthly	premium	 (Finkelstein,	2015).	Through	the	commodification	of	rates,	WCBs	are	enabled	to	carry	out	the	economic	trade.	The	pro-cess	 of	 commodification,	 known	 as	 the	 transformation	 of	 use	 value	 into	 exchange	 value	 (Mosco,	2009)	allows	WCBs	to	price	labor	risks	and	set	the	premium.	Safety	informational	resources	—	rates	—	are	removed	from	their	use	value,	transformed	from	ends	to	means,	collected,	sorted,	classified	and	processed	for	the	purpose	of	setting	up	the	premium	and	allowing	the	trade.	As	any	ordinary	commodity,	safety	rates	are	promoted,	advertized,	packaged	into	products	and	commercialized	by	WCBs	 to	 attract	 new	 customers	 and	 enlarge	 their	 market	 share.	 In	 this	 regard,	 very	 similar	 to	Smythe’s	(1981)	concept	of	predictable	specifications,	these	informational	resources	fall	in	economic	sector	classes	—	forestry,	building,	services,	fishery,	etc...	—	and	diverse	technical	taxonomies	ena-bling	a	price	differentiation	according	to	each	companies’	economic	activity,	historical	performance	
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and	type	of	accident	or	disease.	But	as	a	collection	of	a	diverse	set	of	specifications	these	informa-tional	 resources	are	commodities,	 since	as	a	whole	 they	can	be	 transformed	and	reduced	—	by	a	complex	mathematical	equation	—	just	to	one	rate	to	swap	it	against	the	premium.					Since	rates	are	produced	for	the	purpose	of	economic	exchange,	WCBs	and	corporations	place	their	focus	primarily	on	rates	therefore	engaging	in	somehow	altering	them.	Both	WCBs	and	corpo-rations	are	stimulated	to	intervene	in	some	stages	of	the	process	of	production	in	an	attempt	to	ma-nipulate	 rates	 in	 their	own	 favour.	For	example,	 corporations	 tend	 to	misinform,	discourage,	 and	even	 threaten	workers	 to	prevent	 them	 from	reporting	 labor	 injuries	 and	diseases.	These	 simple	practices	enable	corporations	to	hamper	a	surge	in	rates	thus	holding	the	premium	back.	On	their	part,	WCBs	tend	to	ignore	them	to	avoid	disputes,	keep	intact	their	market	share,	and	attract	new	clients	through	the	commercial	incentive	of	low	rates.	Rather	than	having	a	small	gain	due	to	an	in-crease	on	premiums	WCBs	prioritize	on	preserving	clients	and	therefore	respond	 in	an	 indulgent	way.	However,	WCBs	do	not	take	a	passive	position	to	prevent	the	rise	of	rates.	They	also	place	pres-sure	on	some	stages	of	the	process	that	are	under	their	influence	to	uphold	rates	for	keeping	clients	satisfied	and	preserving	their	commercial	hook.	WCBs	push	for	‘express	medical	services’	(Finkel-stein,	2009)	—i.e.,	quick	medical	assistance	—	to	minimize	the	working	days	lost	and	protect	their	client	companies	from	a	premium	increase.	Moreover,	WCBs	short	rates	through	the	bureaucratic	practice	of	re-classifying	data.	Through	conceptualizing	and	classifying	treatment	days	as	‘postpone-ments’	or	‘deferrals’	WCBs	prevent	treatment	days	from	being	counted	as	lost	days	thereby	main-taining	the	working	days	lost	rate	and	preventing	a	premium	surge.	Due	to	its	subtleness,	re-classi-fying	data	is	extremely	difficult	to	denounce	since	it	is	executed	under	administrative	and	technical	procedures.	As	seen,	the	commodity	nature	of	rates	has	serious	implications	for	the	kind	of	information	pro-duced.	It	plays	a	key	role	in	producing	safety	misinformation	in	the	form	of	distorted	rates.	With	this	regard,	as	misinformation	takes	place	as	a	result	of	the	commodity	form	of	rates,	misinformation	can	be	understood	as	a	reflection	of	WCBs’	process	of	production	and	exchange.	This	happens	because	rates	as	commodities	allow	the	forces	of	economic	calculation	to	enter	the	stage	and	indirectly	and	unintentionally	create	distortions.	Since	WCBs	and	companies	are	economically	pushed	to	routinely	alter	the	process	of	production	of	rates	in	an	attempt	to	control	them	to	their	own	economic	benefit,	safety	misinformation	and	misperception	are	brought	into	existence.	Distorted	rates	are	the	outcome	of	WCBs’	process	of	production	and	neoliberal	context.	It	is	the	very	nature	of	WCBs’	economic	model	characterized	by	its	reliance	on	the	free	market	that	makes	WCBs	to	resign	from	their	responsibility	in	providing	accurate	rates.	WCBs	failure	to	serve	the	public	interest	by	producing	and	circulating	distorted	rates	is	not	explicable	in	terms	of	conspiracy	but	by	the	commodification	of	rates	through	which	WCBs	are	economically	organized.		
	
6.2.	Safety	Informational	Goods	as	Corporate	Friendly	
	As	part	of	its	economic	process	WCBs	produce	and	distribute	safety	knowledge	in	the	form	of	infor-mational	goods	–	e.g.,	posters,	fliers,	brochures,	handbooks,	merchandising	-	to	support	their	client	companies	in	managing	rates	–	i.e.,	keep	rates	stall	or	reduce	them.	Although	informational	goods	are	not	exchanged	for	a	premium,	as	the	case	with	rates	mentioned	above,	they	are	nevertheless	
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under	economic	pressure	to	operate	according	to	the	dictates	of	the	market	place	rather	than	work-ers’	health	and	safety.	Safety	informational	goods	as	safety	packaged	knowledge	—	e.g.,	posters,	fli-ers,	brochures,	handbooks—	operate	as	a	commodity	since	they	are	conditioned	by	an	exchange	value	relationship.			In	this	regard,	since	WCBs	target	corporations	as	clients,	WCBs	tend	to	produce	and	circulate	corporate-friendly	informational	goods.	As	far	as	the	clients	are	companies	rather	than	workers,	the	symbolic	production	must	fulfill	corporate	needs.	By	producing,	packaging,	marketing	and	advertis-ing	safety	knowledge	amenable	to	companies,	WCBs	compete	against	each	other	to	keep	and	increase	their	customer	base.	The	free	market	value	of	satisfying	the	client	shapes	to	a	great	extent	the	nature	of	the	symbolic	content	produced	and	dispersed	as	knowledge	by	WCBs.	It	is	therefore	WCBs’	free	market	design	which	explains	the	production	and	circulation	of	pro-corporate	perspectives	on	labor	health	and	safety.	WCBs	present	safety	as	synonymous	with	business	interests	—	e.g.,	productivity,	efficiency,	loss	control	management	—	and	as	workers’	responsibility	—	e.g.,	unsafe	actions,	unsafe	attitudes,	 failure	 to	 use	 personal	 protective	 equipment.	 These	 corporate-friendly	 meanings	 are	framed	by	WCBs	as	scientific	knowledge	therefore	producing	corporate	ideology.	Due	to	workers’	vital	need	to	attribute	meaning	to	events	(Geertz,	1973),	especially	significant	events	like	labor	inju-ries	and	diseases,	WCBs	are	 in	a	powerful	position	to	advance	pro-corporate	hegemonies	without	being	contested.	These	 institutions	exploit	workers’	vital	need	to	make	sense	of	 fatalities,	 injuries	and	diseases	by	providing	hegemonic	views	that	work	against	their	own	interests.		As	a	result	of	 the	 free	market	pressure,	WCBs’	 informational	goods	on	how	to	prevent	work-related	accidents	and	diseases	take	the	form	of	a	dominant	perspective	through	which	workers	are	brought	into	consent.	WCBs’	institutional	knowledge	becomes	an	hegemony,	a	taken	for	granted	and	unchallenged	view	that	drives	consensus	over	the	adequate	and	acceptable	ways	of	managing	labor	hazards.	This	safety	hegemony	carries	with	it	mental	and	institutional	tools	that	shape	classifications,	perceptions	and	interpretation	schemes	on	which	strategies,	actions	and	policies	are	aligned.	Also,	it	does	eliminate	alternative	views	on	how	to	manage	labor	health	and	safety	thus	restraining	the	range	of	concepts	and	messages	and	limiting	the	repertoire	of	safety	informational	goods.	In	consequence,	contrary	to	the	presumed	benefits	of	a	free	market	scheme	where	competition	results	in	the	natural	expansion	of	the	offer,	the	repertoire	of	symbolic	resources	gets	halted	by	WCBs’	client	orientation.	In	this	case,	the	free	market	value	of	satisfying	the	client	results	in	a	homogenization	of	safety	infor-mational	goods.						Pro-corporate	safety	perspectives	are	characterized	foremost	by	an	unequal	distribution	of	the	blame.	The	 responsibility	 for	an	accident	 is	 removed	 from	 the	 social	organization	of	 the	work	—	something	that	the	corporation	is	responsible	for	—	and	placed	on	workers	themselves.	For	example,	based	on	a	well-known	claim	from	H.W.	Heinrich	that	88%	of	labor	accidents	are	due	to	unsafe	acts	performed	by	workers	(Heinrich,	1931),	pro-corporate	discourse	can	successfully	relocate	the	blame	of	labor	accidents	and	diseases	on	the	individual.	It	doesn’t	matter	that	Heinrich’s	study	had	serious	methodological	faults	in	terms	of	how	data	was	collected,	the	quality	of	the	data,	the	analysis	method	and	the	evidence	of	his	conclusions	(Manuele,	2011).	As	 far	as	Heinrich’s	conclusions	provide	the	adequate	rationale	to	support	companies	in	relocating	the	blame,	this	pseudo-knowledge	is	incorpo-rated	in	informational	good,	circulated,	promoted	and	advertised	as	scientific	knowledge	by	WCBs.	
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Also,	by	following	Loss	Control	Management	(Bird	&	Loftus,	1976),	WCBs	support	companies’	inter-ests	by	framing	safety	as	an	economic	practice.	WCBs	promote	Bird	&	Loftus’	logic	of	reducing	acci-dents	by	decreasing	property	loss,	property	damage	and	productive	delays.	Under	this	perspective,	labor	accidents	are	redefined	as	‘incidents’	in	order	to	equalize	them	to	property	loss	and	damage	incidents	and	therefore	blend	them	together	under	a	productive	chain	of	management	control.	This	allows	companies	to	control	labor	accidents	and	diseases	in	line	with	their	production	processes	by	deleting	the	natural	conflict	between	safety	and	productivity.	WCBs	know	that	in	order	to	succeed	in	the	market	place	it	is	not	enough	to	produce	and	circulate	informational	goods	amenable	to	companies	but	to	extensively	promote	and	marketize	this	view.	In	this	 regard,	WCBs	engage	 in	propaganda	 favourable	 to	corporate	 interests	 in	order	 to	build	 their	brand	around	a	pro-corporate	appeal	and	imbue	themselves	with	an	attractive	business	image.	On	a	regular	basis	WCBs	promote	through	the	mass	media	what	they	call	a	‘safety	culture’,	a	series	of	cor-porate	messages	directed	to	the	general	public	on	how	to	achieve	health	and	safety	at	the	worksite.	This	‘safety	culture’	propaganda	is	saturated	with	pro-corporate	meanings	and	anti-workers’	myths	–	e.g.,	workers	as	unsafe,	ignorant	and	lazy.	Mainly,	these	messages	reinforce	both	the	displacement	of	 accidents’	 responsibility	 –from	 the	 organization	 to	workers–	 and	 the	 economic	 perspective	 of	safety.	On	the	one	side,	by	promoting	safe	attitudes,	safety	behaviours,	the	use	of	personal	protective	equipment	and	complying	with	the	organization’s	rules,	WCBs	install	the	hegemony	that	accidents	are	due	to	workers’	fault	rather	than	companies’	social	organization	of	work.	On	the	other	side,	by	linking	 safety	 to	 productivity,	 efficiency,	 property	 damage,	 savings	 and	 a	 good	 corporate	 image,	WCBs	establish	the	hegemonic	view	that	safety	is	as	an	economic	activity	to	be	pursued	in	line	with	companies’	economic	interests.	In	this	regard,	the	strongest	hegemony	promoted	by	WCBs	is	the	idea	that	 corporate	 and	workers’	 values,	 interests	 and	 priorities	 are	 one	 and	 the	 same.	 By	 constantly	meshing	corporate	interests	and	workers’	needs,	WCBs	create	the	notion	that	by	promoting	workers’	health,	companies’	interests	can	be	achieved	and	vice-versa.	This	hegemony	enables	WCBs	to	occlude	the	natural	conflict	between	corporate	interests	and	workers’	health,	an	issue	that	prominent	health	scholars	call	to	address	(Karassek	&	Theorell,	1990;	Siegrist,	1996).		
	
7.	Concluding	Remarks	
	This	examination	shows	that	WCBs’	informational	resources	and	goods	are	strongly	intertwined	to	their	economic	process	of	exchange	and	neoliberal	regime.	WCBs	are	compelled	to	cede	control	over	their	informational	resources	and	goods	to	the	dynamics	of	the	market	place	and	the	logic	of	profit	maximization.	Both	the	free	market	and	WCBs’	process	of	exchange	constitute	the	key	reference	point	to	make	sense	of	the	production	of	safety	information.	On	the	one	side,	due	to	the	commodification	of	informational	resources	—	i.e.,	rates	—	and	the	economic	incentive	to	keep	them	down	both	by	WCBs	and	their	client	companies,	distorted	informational	resources	are	inadvertently	created	and	dispersed.	On	the	other	side,	due	to	WCBs’	need	to	direct	the	production	and	promotion	of	informa-tional	 goods	 to	 their	 client	 companies,	 pro-corporate	 perspectives	 on	 safety	 are	 involuntarily	brought	to	life	as	an	all-encompassing	hegemony.	By	ceding	control	over	their	symbolic	content	to	the	dynamics	of	the	market	place	and	the	economic	logic,	WCBs	also	cede	their	social	responsibility	to	provide	accurate	informational	resources	and	goods	to	protect	workers	at	the	workplace.	Chilean	
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WCBs	fail	to	protect	workers	against	labor	hazards	by	producing	and	supplying	distorted	informa-tional	resources	and	pro-corporate	informational	goods.	The	effects	of	distorted	rates	and	pro-corporate	views	are	not	negative	to	everyone	as	it	might	appear.	The	impact	is	a	dialectic	one,	with	workers	as	losers	on	the	one	side	and	WCBs	and	corpora-tions	as	winners	on	the	other.	Since	workers	rely	on	WCBs	for	accurate	risks	information	and	high	quality	safety	knowledge	to	interpret	and	respond	to	labor	hazards,	the	production	and	circulation	of	distorted	and	corporate	friendly	information	harms	them	directly.	Workers	are	cognitively	misled	and	left	physically	and	mentally	unprotected	at	the	worksite.	On	the	one	hand,	distorted	low	rates	minimize	the	degree	of	risks	at	the	worksite,	and	on	the	other,	pro-corporate	safety	knowledge	oc-cludes	the	risks	of	the	social	organization	of	work.	Social	dimensions	of	health	such	as	excessive	de-mand,	low	control,	effort/reward	imbalance	and	lack	of	social	support	(Wilkinson,	2001)	are	com-pletely	neglected	and	left	apart.	Safety	misperception	as	an	inaccurate	mode	of	perceiving	hazards	at	the	worksite	arises	as	the	main	outcome	of	the	lack	of	accurate	informational	resources	and	goods.	Regarding	WCBs	and	their	client	corporations,	the	production	of	distorted	and	pro-corporate	infor-mation	is	convenient	for	both	of	them.	First,	distorted	rates	allow	WCBs	and	companies	to	maintain	a	supportive	public	opinion.	Low	rates	bring	legitimacy	to	WCBs	by	presenting	them	as	thriving	in-stitutions	and	give	prominence	to	companies	by	presenting	them	as	socially	responsible.	Second,	cor-porate	friendly	knowledge	aid	WCBs	and	companies	to	sustain	policies	hurtful	to	corporate	interests.	Since	pro-corporate	safety	knowledge	liberates	companies	from	their	responsibility	in	the	produc-tion	of	fatalities,	injuries	and	diseases	by	relocating	the	blame	on	workers,	companies	are	shielded	from	major	interventions.				To	conclude,	 it	 is	 important	 to	emphasize	 that	 this	communication	breach	 is	not	because	 the	right	to	high-quality	information	and	knowledge	is	absent	from	the	political	scenario.	Government	officials	are	well	aware	that	accurate	safety	information	is	vital	to	protect	workers.	The	dilemma	is	that	the	right	to	high-quality	safety	information	is	placed	in	subordination	to	other	rights.	As	Marx	precisely	stated,	human	rights	are	denied	when	rights	of	private	property,	capital	accumulation	and	market	exchange	are	given	primacy	(Marx,	1978).	In	this	case,	it	is	WCBs’	primacy	over	market	ex-change,	competition,	and	economic	interests	that	indirectly	deny	the	production	and	supply	of	accu-rate	rates	and	safety	knowledge.	The	refusal	to	high-quality	safety	information	is	a	result	of	WCBs’	economic	organization.	Therefore,	it	is	imperative	to	transform	WCB’s	economic	base	to	allow	the	production	and	distribution	of	safety	information	in	conditions	of	equity	and	liberty,	in	accordance	to	workers’	non-commercial	needs.			
Acknowledgement		Thank	you	to	the	reviewers	for	valuable	suggestions	on	this	paper.	This	research	was	supported	by	a	Student	Graduate	Stipend	Award	from	the	Centre	for	Research	on	Work	Disability	Policy	(Social	Sciences	and	Humanities	Research	Council	Award	895-2012-1017).	I	am	grateful	to	John	Calvert	for	nominating	me	for	this	award.		 	
	 	
Finkelstein	
	
31	
References	 	Bird,	F.,	&	Loftus,	R.	(1976).	Loss	control	management.	Georgia:	Institute	Press.	Comisión	Asesora	Presidencial	para	la	Seguridad	en	el	Trabajo.	(2010).	Informe	final.	Retrieved	from	http://docplayer.es/348051-Comision-asesora-presidencial-para-la-seguridad-en-el-tra-bajo-informe-final.html		Dümmer,	W.	(1997).	Occupational	health	and	workman's	compensation	in	Chile.	Applied	Occupa-
tional	and	Environmental	Hygiene.	12	(12),	805–812.	Finkelstein,	R.	(2009).	El	rol	constitutivo	de	la	seguridad	ocupacional.	Ciencia	&	trabajo,	33	(11),	145-151.		Finkelstein,	R.	(2015).	The	commodity	form	of	safety	information.	Triple	C,	13(2),	610-623.	Re-trieved	from	http://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/712/768	Garnham,	N.	(1990).	Capitalism	and	communication:	Global	culture	and	the	economics	of	information.	London:	Sage	Publications.	Garnham,	N.	(2014).	The	political	economy	of	communication	revisited.	In	J.	Wasko,	G.	Murdock	and	H.	Sousa	(Eds.).	The	handbook	of	political	economy	of	communications.	Oxford:	John	Wiley.			Geertz,	C.	(1973).	The	interpretation	of	cultures.	New	York:	Basic	Guinnane,	T.	&	Streb,	J.	(2015).		Incentives	that	(could	have)	saved	lives:	Government	regulation	of	accident	insurance	associations	in	Germany,	1884–1914.	The	Journal	of	Economic	History,	75(4),	1196	–	1227.				Harvey,	D.	(2005).	A	brief	history	of	neoliberalism.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	Heinrich,	H.W.	(1931).	Industrial	accident	prevention:	A	scientific	approach.	New	York:	McGraw-Hill.	Karasek,	R.	&	Theorell,	T.	(1990).	Healthy	work:	Stress,	productivity,	and	the	reconstruction	of	working	life.	New	York:	Basic	Books.	Klein,	N.	(2007).	The	shock	doctrine:	The	rise	of	disaster	capitalism.	New	York:	Metropolitan	Books.			Manuele,	F.	A.	(2011).	Reviewing	Heinrich:	Dislodging	two	myths	from	the	practice	of	safety.	Pro-fessional	Safety,	October	52-61.	Marx,	K.	(1978).	Economic	and	philosophic	manuscripts	of	1844.	In	R.	Tucker	(Ed.),	The	Marx-En-gels	reader	(2nd	ed.)	(pp.	66-105).	New	York:	W.	W.	Norton	&	Company.	Marx,	K.	(1990).	Capital,	volume	I.	London:	Penguin	Classics.	Mosco,	V.	(2009).	The	political	economy	of	communication	(2nded.).	London:	Sage.	Schiller,	D.	(2007).	How	to	think	about	information.	Illinois:	University	of	Illinois	Press.		Siegrist,	J.	(1996).	Adverse	Health	effects	of	high-effort/low-reward	conditions.	Journal	of	Occupa-
tional	Health	Psychology.	1(1),	27-41.	Smythe,	D.	(1981).	On	the	audience	commodity	and	its	work.	In	M.	Durham	and	D.	Kellner	(Eds.),	
Media	and	cultural	studies:	Key	works	(2nd	ed.)	(pp.	185-204).	West	Sussex,	UK:	Wiley-Black-well.	Wilkinson,	C.	(2001).	Fundamentals	of	health	at	work:	The	social	dimensions.	London:	Taylor	&	Fran-cis.		
